The war in Iran, triggered by U.S. and Israeli strikes on February 28, has not drawn China into a decisive role despite early assumptions in Washington that great power competition would shape the conflict.
China’s response has followed a predictable diplomatic pattern: shuttle diplomacy by special envoy Zhai Jun, extensive phone calls by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and routine statements at the UN Security Council. These actions reflect engagement but lack the leverage or willingness to alter the course of the war between the U.S., Israel, and Iran.
The China-Pakistan “Five-Point Plan” announced in Beijing on March 31 — calling for an immediate cease-fire, peace talks, protection of civilians, safe shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and respect for the UN Charter — mirrors seven similar plans China has issued since 2013 for regional conflicts. Each plan repeats the same language on dialogue, sovereignty, and UN-led processes, yet none have resolved the crises they targeted.
This consistency signals not a strategy for resolution but a bureaucratic habit. As the Atlantic Council notes, framing the Iran war as a China issue reflects lazy thinking in Washington more than ground realities. China did not shape the escalation, is not a military participant, and cannot impose outcomes on the main belligerents.
Still, the war has created friction in the U.S.-China relationship. Two months ago, Wang Yi predicted a “big year” for bilateral ties ahead of a planned Trump visit to Beijing. That trip was delayed after the U.S.-Israel strikes began, and the visit — now rescheduled for May — is likely to be overshadowed by the conflict.
China has accused the U.S. of “dangerous and irresponsible” behavior over its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and vowed to retaliate against threatened U.S. tariffs. In turn, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent labeled China an “unreliable global partner” for stockpiling oil, a claim China declined to address directly.
On Truth Social, Trump claimed China was “very happy” about the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and said Beijing had agreed not to send weapons to Iran — a statement Beijing has not confirmed. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence briefings suggest China may have provided military aid to Iran, a charge Beijing denies.
Early in the conflict, analysts saw potential short-term benefits for China: higher oil prices hurting the U.S. more, damage to Trump’s global credibility, diversion of U.S. military resources, and distraction from Asia-Pacific security concerns. China’s fossil fuel stockpiles and diversified energy mix initially shielded it from the worst of the oil shock.
But those advantages are fading. Pump prices for drivers in China have already risen, and Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based international relations scholar, warns the conflict “deeply undermines China’s energy security.” This raises concerns about Beijing’s long-term planning, particularly regarding any future contingency involving Taiwan.
Shen’s warning highlights a strategic contradiction: while China sought to avoid direct involvement in the Iran war to preserve focus on the Pacific, the conflict now threatens to undermine the very energy security needed for a potential Taiwan scenario.
The war has disrupted the delicate U.S.-China relationship that Wang Yi hoped to stabilize in March. What was expected to be a year of diplomatic progress is now defined by mutual accusations, disrupted diplomacy, and overlapping strategic risks.
China’s approach remains consistent with its historical pattern: active diplomacy without decisive action. But the conflict is testing whether that approach can protect its broader interests as secondary effects — from energy prices to military perceptions — begin to accumulate.
Is China militarily supporting Iran in the war?
U.S. intelligence briefings have suggested China may have helped Iran militarily, but Beijing has denied these claims. The Guardian reports that China declined to elaborate on whether such support would affect the rescheduled Trump visit to Beijing in May.
How has the Iran war affected China’s energy security?
Despite initial insulation from oil price shocks due to stockpiles and a diversified energy mix, pump prices for drivers in China have increased. Shen Dingli warns the conflict deeply undermines China’s energy security, which could complicate planning for future contingencies, including a potential Taiwan scenario.